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Abstract 
 
 
This paper investigates why children work by studying the wage elasticity of child 
labour supply. Incorporating subsistence constraints into a model of labour supply, 
we show that a negative wage elasticity favours the hypothesis that poverty compels 
work whereas a positive wage elasticity would favour the alternative view that 
children work because the relative returns to school are low. Distinguishing between 
these alternatives is important for policy. Existing studies have concentrated on the 
income elasticity, but this tells us nothing other than that leisure (or education) is a 
normal good. Using a large household survey for rural Pakistan, we estimate 
structural labour supply models for boys and girls in wage work, conditioning on full 
income and a range of demographic variables. Our estimates describe a forward 
falling labour supply curve for boys, consistent with the view that boys work on 
account of the compulsions of poverty. This is less clear in the case of girls. 
Therefore, raising the return to schooling for girls may draw them out of work, but 
eliminating boys' wage work requires alleviation of the poverty of their households. 
Trade sanctions or bans on child labour may have deleterious consequences for 
these households unless they are compensated for the loss of income. 
 
Keywords: Child labour, education, poverty, gender, intertemporal labour supply. 
 
JEL Nos. J22, J13, D12, O12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© The authors. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, 
including  notice, is given to the source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence address: Dr Sonia Bhalotra, Department of Applied Economics, 
University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DE, UK: Email: 
sonia.bhalotra@cam.ac.uk 
 
 
1Is Child Work Necessary?
1. Introduction
Why do children work? A common but not undisputed perception is
that child participation in work is compelled by household poverty1.
Indeed, both the geographic distribution of child workers today and the
economic history of specific regions demonstrate a clearly negative
association of child work and aggregate income2. However, it is unclear
whether it was the rise in household incomes that eliminated child labour
by dispelling the need for it, or whether the instrumental factor was the
introduction of relevant legislation. This is because aggregate income may
register an increase without any increase in the incomes of households
supplying child labour. At the same time, economic growth or increases in
aggregate income tend to be associated with the development of legal and
political infrastructure, as well as with shifting and evolving social norms.
In the last decade, microdata for developing countries have become
available, which make it possible to disentangle household living
standards (a microeconomic variable, which differs across households)
from factors like new laws or changed norms, which apply equally across
                                          
1 See this view expressed, though not established, in Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) and Hamid
(1994), for example. In much of the recent theoretical work on child labour (discussed in Section
2.1), it is axiomatic that households providing child labour are poor. However, it is only Basu
and Van (1998) that use precisely the notion of how poor (close to subsistence) that is invoked in
this paper.
2 See the data in Basu (1999), for example.
2households. Studies using these microdata have produced mixed results
(see Section 2). While a number find that the work participation rates of
children are uncorrelated with household income, some do establish a
significant negative relation of household income with child work.
However, a negative impact of income on child labour does little
more than affirm the plausible belief that child leisure (or child schooling)3
is a normal good. Given that leisure (or education) is a normal good, does
child labour arise primarily as a result of household poverty or primarily
because the relative returns to alternatives like school attendance are low?
There is no rigorous evidence on this question and yet the policy
implications of the two alternatives are dramatically different. If the
objective of policy is to move working children in to school, should the
extra unit of public money be spent on alleviating poverty in households
supplying child labour (e.g., by giving them a subsidy to compensate the
opportunity cost of attending school) or on improving the quality and
relevance of education (e.g., direct spending on school infrastructure and
organisation or on lowering the direct costs of school attendance)? The first
strategy has been adopted by the Food-for-Education Program in
Bangladesh (see Ravallion and Wodon, 1999) and the second underlies the
Back-to-School Program in Indonesia (see Sayed, 2000).
This paper argues that estimates of the wage elasticity of child labour
supply allow us to discriminate between these alternative hypotheses.
                                          
3 For adults, the alternative to work is defined as leisure but for children the choices include
school.
3Suppose that households are very poor in the specific sense that income
without child earnings falls below subsistence requirements, or that child
work is necessary. Then a decrease in the child wage must be compensated
by an increase in child hours in order to meet the subsistence target. For a
fixed target, the wage elasticity will be –1. More generally, the income
effect of a change in the wage of an individual is more likely to dominate
the substitution effect in poor households than in rich ones. We therefore
define our poverty hypothesis to imply that the wage elasticity is negative. If
we observe a positive wage elasticity, we can reject the poverty hypothesis
and conclude that consumption is comfortably above subsistence for the
sample households. In this case, the hours of child work are determined
primarily by relative returns (that is, the substitution effect dominates).
Section 4. formalises the hypothesis by incorporating subsistence
constraints in to a labour supply model.
If we identify a negative wage elasticity, we may argue that
improving returns to education is unlikely to have a substantial impact on
child work. This is because the marginal utility of consumption increases
very rapidly as people get close to subsistence4 and is so large in this region
that creating matching increases in the marginal return to education may
not be in the scope of policy5. If, on the other hand, we observe a positive
                                          
4 This intuitive idea seems not to have exerted its power until recently. See, for example, Deaton
(1998) in the context of the precautionary savings hypothesis.
5 This argument uses the standard result that investing in education or labour markets to
increase the return to education will tend to alter the relative marginal utilities of consumption
and schooling in a manner that will increase the demand for schooling.
4wage elasticity, then investing in schools (or in improving labour market
opportunities) will have a non-negligible impact on child work.
Using survey data for 2400 households, labour supply equations for boys
and girls who work for wages in rural Pakistan are estimated. We condition
on participation and exploit the substantial variation in hours of work to
estimate the wage elasticity6. The main result is that the wage elasticity is
significantly negative for boys and insignificantly different from zero for
girls (Section 6).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature,
delineating the contributions of this paper. The data are described in
Section 3, where relevant descriptive statistics are presented. A theoretical
framework is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 sets out the empirical model
and the estimation strategy. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7
investigates their robustness. Section 8 presents further analysis of the
results and Section 9 discusses policy implications and concludes.
2. Existing Literature and Contributions of this Paper
Theory
Much of the small theoretical literature on child labour is premised
on the idea that children work because their households are poor. In its
extreme subsistence form, the poverty hypothesis is axiomatic in Basu and
Van (1998). To the extent that the adult wage proxies poverty, as assumed
5in Basu and Van, this paper may be seen as a test of their critical
assumption7. Lahiri and Jaffrey (1999) and Ranjan (1999) present models in
which child labour arises as a result of imperfect credit markets. Clearly,
credit constraints are more likely to bind for the rural poor, not only
because their average incomes are low but also because their incomes are
particularly volatile8. Eswaran (1998) jointly models child labour and
fertility, showing that a poverty trap is created when child mortality is high
and child labour is socially acceptable.
The possibility that child labour is a rational response to relative
returns in an adverse economic environment has also been modelled. In
their pioneering work, Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) find that high
fertility and therefore child labour in India in the late 1950s was motivated
by the relatively high ratio of child wages to school returns. Cigno and
Rosati (2000) also model child labour jointly with fertility and child
mortality, and the role of prices (the marginal cost of human capital,
including the child wage) is explicit. Bhalotra and Heady (2000) model
child farm labour in a two-period setting with credit and labour market
imperfections and distinguish relative returns from wealth effects.
                                                                                                                                       
6 The wage elasticity of labour force participation will of course be positive. I have confirmed
this for the data used in this paper.
7 Smoothing the discontinuous labour supply curve in Basu and Van gives a negative labour
supply curve. However, as their paper is purely theoretical, they do not raise the hypothesis of
the wage elasticity being negative.
8 In relation to the poverty hypothesis of this paper, note that finding that poverty compels child
work is consistent with households either being chronically poor or else transiently poor and
credit-constrained.
6Cockburn (2000) proposes a related model of child work on the household
farm in which assets reflect relative returns as well as wealth.
Empirical research on child labour
What is the evidence? It is mixed and it is not clear how robust it is.
Motivations other than poverty
There is some evidence that children work for reasons other than
poverty such as to gain economic independence from their parents (see
Iversen (2000) for rural Karnataka, India), because school attendance
affords the child a disutility that dominates the disutility from work (e.g.
Delap (1998) on urban Bangladesh), or in order to acquire training (see
Aragao-Lagergren, 1997). However, these results are difficult to generalise
because they rest on isolated case-studies.
Using large representative household survey data, Bhalotra and
Heady (2000), Cigno and Rosati (2000), and Cockburn (2000) all find
evidence consistent with the view that imperfect labour markets can
explain child work. In particular, when it is difficult to hire in farm labour,
land owning households may employ their children on the household farm
and the evidence is that child work is increasing in farm size. The children
of the very poorest (landless) households may not work because there are
limited opportunities for work. There is also some evidence that credit
constraints explain child labour- rather than low permanent income or
7wealth9. For example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) and Sawada (1999) find
that children are taken out of school in response to household income
shocks in rural South India and Pakistan respectively.
A further possible reason that children work, distinct from poverty, is
that their parents are selfish. Historians have debated this question with
regard to child labour in nineteenth century England (e.g. Nardinelli, 1990,
p.94) against Anderson, 1971) and Brazil (Rizzini, 1999). Burra (1995) and
Gupta (1998) present arguments to suggest parental callousness in
contemporary India, and Bhalotra (2000) finds evidence consistent with
parental selfishness using representative data for contemporary rural
Pakistan.
All in all, as indicated in the first paragraph of Section 1, the poverty
hypothesis is not trivially true- it deserves investigation.
The evidence on poverty and child labour
A number of studies find that working children contribute a fairly
substantial fraction of household income10. Our data produce figures in line
with some of these studies: for children in wage work, the average
contribution of boys is close to 30% and of girls, to 15%. This makes it
plausible that households rely upon the child’s contribution. A number of
                                          
9 In a cross section, this distinction may be obscured. Bhalotra and Heady (2000) show that the
presence of credit constraints will strengthen the negative effect of income on child work. The
cited studies exploit panel data to look at the effects of exogenous income shocks on schooling
and, by implication, child labour.
10 See Sharma and Mittar (1990) and Swaminathan (1998) for India, Cain (1977) for Bangladesh,
Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1994) and Myers (1989) for Paraguay, Kassouf (1998) for Brazil.
8recent analyses of child labour by economists have used microdata for
developing countries and found that the participation rates of children are
uncorrelated with household income (e.g. Nielsen (1998), Canagarajah and
Coulombe (1998), Sasaki and Temesgen (1999)), though some find the
expected negative effect (e.g. Cigno and Rosati, 2000)11.
Since most of these analyses are conducted as if household income
(or poverty status) were exogenous and this will tend to create a positive
bias in the OLS coefficient, it is possible that a negative income effect
would be identified more systematically if appropriate instrumental
variables were used12. Indeed, using community-level variables to
instrument income, Bhalotra and Heady (2000) find that the Smith-Blundell
test rejects exogeneity of income and the OLS estimates have the expected
upward bias. Nevertheless, they identify a negative income effect for only
two of the four samples of children (girls and boys in rural Pakistan and
Ghana). This may not be terribly surprising in the case of farm work since
average hours in farm work are half-time or less, and it is often combined
with school attendance. Most existing studies (cited above) combine the
different types of child work (eg. wage work and work on household
                                          
11 A variety of direct income effects can be found in Grootaert (1998), Jensen (1999), Kassouf
(1998), Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995),
Psacharopoulos (1997)) and Ray (2000), amongst others.
12 Ray (2000) deducts child income (imputing a wage to non-wage workers) from household
income. While this will ameliorate simultaneity bias it will not eliminate it if parent and child
labour supply are simultaneously chosen. Grootaert (1998) acknowledges that income is likely
to be endogenous and attempts to deal with this by replacing income with a dummy for
whether or not the household falls into the lowest income quantile. However, discarding
information on income does not solve the problem.
9farms), thereby imposing a restrictive homogeneity of the income effect
and possibly obscuring it13.
Wage elasticities
Estimates of the child wage elasticity allow us to discriminate
between alternative hypotheses for why children work, which estimates of
the income elasticity cannot do (see Sections 1 and 4). There appear to be
no comparable estimates of child wage elasticities in the literature. Most
econometric analyses of child labour estimate reduced form participation
equations and do not include the wage as a regressor. In their studies of
household production and time allocation, Levy (1985), Rosenzweig (1981)
and Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) find positive own-wage elasticities for
children in the rural areas of Egypt and India respectively, but negative
wage elasticities are ruled out by construction in their models14. Ray (2000)
estimates tobit models for Pakistan and Peru and finds a positive wage
elasticity for children. However, since he merges rural and urban data and
combines wage work with work on the household farm or enterprise, his
estimates are not comparable with ours15.
                                          
13 Bhalotra and Heady (2000) show that, under perfect capital markets, the negative effect of
income on child labour which is expected when the choice is between leisure and work may not
appear when the effective choice involves re-allocating an hour from school to work.
14 Estimates of wage elasticities of participation are expected to be positive. This is confirmed for
our data.
15 It is very unlikely that the restrictions on the slope parameters of the labour supply function
implied by Ray’s specification are valid. Also, Ray uses the tobit model and he sets the wage for
all non-working children equal to the smallest wage amongst working children. The child wage
is assumed exogenous.
10
Turning from work on child labour to the larger literature on labour
supply, there is some evidence of negative wage elasticities for adult men
(see, for instance, Rosenzweig (1980) for rural India, Attanasio and
MaCurdy (1997) and Kneiser (1976) for the US, Kooreman and Kapteyn
(1986) for the Netherlands), though these are typically found at high wage
levels. Negative wage elasticities at low wages have been found for Mexico
using data on adults (Hernandez-Licona, 1996). Looking at children
sharpens the question: Since the earnings of adults provide non-labour
income for children, we would expect forward falling labour supply curves
to be less likely to be observed for children than for adults.
Contributions of this paper
This paper makes precise the common notion that children work
because they come from subsistence-poor households and argues that this
hypothesis can be tested against alternatives by estimating the wage
elasticity of labour supply (Section 4). It emphasises the importance for
policy purposes of distinguishing between the alternatives. An important
advantage of this approach is that it avoids the problems of selecting a
poverty line and assuming that there is a discrete jump in poverty status at
that line. It differs from most existing work, which investigates the poverty
hypothesis by studying the income elasticity of child work participation. It
is argued in this paper that this does no more than establish that child
leisure (or education) are normal goods.
11
Data on non-labour income is needed to obtain estimates of direct
income effects. The data used contain information on household
consumption and on the labour income of all household members. In the
absence of a panel that records asset changes, this information is used to
create a lifecycle-consistent definition of household income (see Blundell
and Walker, 1986). In contrast, existing studies use reported income (a
static definition). When there are lifecycle aspects to decision making, this
yields wage elasticities that confound the effects of shifts in wage profiles
with movements along them (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1998). Unlike
much of the existing work on child labour, this paper allows for the
endogeneity of household income and the child wage. Careful attention is
paid to identification and since weak instruments can generate inconsistent
estimates (see Staiger and Stock (1994) and Bhargava and Sargan (1983)),
tests are provided for the strength of the instruments used. Similarly, the
final estimates of the wage elasticity are subject to a range of robustness
checks.
Most available studies pool data on boys and girls and on rural and
urban regions. They also tend to combine child wage labour with child
labour supplied to the household farm or enterprise. On the basis that the
implied pooling restrictions are unlikely to be valid, this paper estimates
separate labour supply curves for boys and girls, and concentrates on rural
areas, where child work and poverty are most prevalent. It focuses on
wage work rather than on household employment because the data reveal
12
that wage work is the most demanding form of child work, and also
because it is only for wage work that we have information on earnings.
3. The Data
The data are the rural observations from the Pakistan Integrated
Household Survey (PIHS) for 1991, available from the Living Standards
Measurement Survey unit of the World Bank. There are 2400 rural
households. Households are large and complex, the mean household size
being 7.63 (mode=7). We therefore have information on more than 18000
individuals. The survey collects detailed data on schooling and on
economic activity.
3.1. Defining children
Children are commonly defined as persons under 15 years of age, for
example by the ILO and the UNICEF (e.g., ILO, 1996), though the empirical
literature has used a variety of definitions in the range 5-18 years. Since
employment questions in our survey are only addressed to individuals ten
years or older, we analyse the data for 10-14 year olds. Since we isolate
children in wage work, gender-specific sample sizes are small. In the interests
of robustness, results are also reported for wage working individuals aged
10-17. The employment of children on household farms in Pakistan (and
13
Ghana) is analysed in Bhalotra and Heady (2000). This paper is concerned
with wage employment16.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Prevalence of child work and gender differentials
School enrollment is very low in Pakistan, even in comparison with
other low income countries, and child participation rates are among the
highest in the world (ILO, 1996). In comparison with sub-Saharan Africa or
with neighbouring India, Pakistan also has a relatively large fraction of
children in wage work. Table 1 presents a profile of child activity rates.
Among 10-14 year olds, 6% of boys and 12% of girls are in wage
employment. Comparing these figures with the participation rates for
adults puts them in perspective. Amongst adults (18 years and older), only
36% of men and 15% of women are wage workers, the larger fraction are
self-employed.
The participation rate of girls exceeds that of boys in both wage work
and work on household farms and enterprises, but the gender differential
in work participation is small compared to the enormous gap in school
attendance. This is because a much larger fraction of girls, as compared
with boys, report “no activity” (“none of the above activities” in Table 1),
which may reflect engagement in domestic work. Where data on domestic
                                          
16 Children working for wages are classified as being in one of three activities: permanent
agricultural employment, seasonal agricultural employment and non-agricultural employment.
14
work are unavailable, one needs to be careful about assuming that
variables which release children from work will also put them in school.
Work hours and competing child activities
The sample probabilities of combining activities are also in Table 1. In
contrast to sub-Saharan Africa (see Bhalotra and Heady (2000),
Canagarajah and Nielsen (1999), for example), it is uncommon for children
in Pakistan to combine activities. Virtually no children combine wage work
and school. It is thus clear that wage work competes with schooling17. Since
hours of wage work average 45 a week for boys and 31 a week for girls
(Table 2), it is unsurprising that, for most children, it cannot be combined
with school or other types of work. Around this high mean is considerable
variation, which is exploited in estimating the wage elasticity. Kernel
density plots for hours in Figure 2 show the distribution to be bi-modal.
Child labour and household living standards
Simple tabulations show that, among boys and girls alike, average
household income is lower for workers than for nonworkers. Since this is
so even without deducting the child’s contribution to household income, it
suggests that poverty is an important determinant of child work.
Furthermore, average household income is lower in the sample of children
                                          
17 To assess whether children reporting wage work in the reference week are from households
experiencing a rough patch, it is useful to look at the average completed school years of these
children. These are 2.1 years for boys in wage work as compared with 4.6 for those who are not
in wage work, even though workers are older on average. The corresponding figures for girls
are 0.6 years as compared with 1.9 years.
15
working for wages as compared with the sample of children employed on
the household farm/enterprise. Thus wage working children appear to be
particularly impoverished.
Table 2 and Figure 1 present work and school participation rates by
expenditure quartiles. Amongst the poorest 25% of rural households, a
remarkable 19% of girls are in wage work as compared with only 8% of
boys. In the richest 25% of households, the participation rate falls to 9.4%
for girls and 5% for boys. These data indicate that the burden of household
poverty is born disproportionately by girls. The gender differential is even
more remarkable in the relation of household living standards and school
attendance.
These data support the poverty hypothesis in that it is clear that the
rates of school attendance increase and of child work decrease in moving
from the lowest to the highest quartile18. Notice, however, that child work
participation in the upper quartile remains at a level high enough to merit
investigation. The poverty hypothesis alone cannot explain this.
It is recognised that household expenditure levels may be endogenous
to child employment rates (though not, of course, to school participation
rates). However, if the income contribution of children is subtracted away,
the poorest households, amongst whom child work is more prevalent, will
                                          
18 The poverty line is just above the mean expenditure per capita of the lowest quartile, so
households challenged to meet subsistence requirements are expected to be in this group. Malik
(1995) estimates the poverty line for 1990-1 for rural Pakistan to be Rs. 243 per capita, using
calorie-expenditure functions estimated on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey
which has a similar sampling frame to the survey that we use (the PIHS).
16
be even poorer. The pattern we observe across quartiles is therefore
unlikely to be altered. Nevertheless, as a check, child activity rates were
tabulated by quartiles of adult income19 and in the upper quartile 6% of
children were in wage work and 20% in self employment. The persistence
of child work among the richest 25% of the rural population is therefore
not the result of the endogeneity of expenditure.
For the reasons discussed in Sections 1 and 2, we estimate hours
equations conditional on participation. So, while the participation-poverty
relations in Table 2 and Figure 1 are an important description of the work
environment, it is also useful to look at hours of work (conditional on
participation) by quartile. This information is also in Table 2 and the
relation of work hours and poverty looks non-linear. Non-parametric
estimates of this relation, obtained using a Gaussian kernel, are in Figure 3.
Consistent with the participation data, and also with the results obtained in
Section 6, after conditioning on a range of variables, the expected negative
relation of household living standards and child work is clearer for girls. 
                                          
19 Household income consists of wage income and income from the household farm and
enterprise. The latter can only be assigned to individual household members by estimation of a
production function for farm/enterprise work, and this is deferred. Adult income is defined
here as the difference between total household income and child wage income. If the intra-
household allocation of labour (leisure) is such that parents first set their own labour supply
and then set child labour supply conditional on their income, then adult income will be
exogenous to child work. A tabulation of child activity rates by adult income is available from
the author on request.
17
Child labour and the child wage
A two-way scatter plot of hours and the wage rate for children in
wage work is in Figure 4, where a cubic spline is fitted to the data. This
reveals a negative tendency for boys and no relation of the two variables
for girls. The plot is only indicative because non-labour income and other
variables have, of course, not been held constant. It is nevertheless
consistent with the results in Section 6.
4. A Theoretical Framework
This section sets out a model of labour supply which clarifies the role
of the labour supply of household members other than the child and the
definition of household income. By introducing subsistence constraints, it
defines the poverty hypothesis that is investigated in this paper.
Household decision making
We assume that children under 15 do not bargain with their parents
because they do not have a valid fallback option. The unitary specification
used is consistent with the view that a “dictator” decides what labour, if
any, the child will supply and also with the view that parents and children
have common preferences. This is not nearly as unreasonable as the
assumption of common preferences across spouses which has, in many
contexts, been rejected in favour of the bargaining model. It may be
important to allow the child labour decision to be influenced by the relative
bargaining powers of the mother and the father of the child (e.g. Galasso,
1999) but our data do not have variables (“extra environmental
18
parameters”- see McElroy, 1990) that can be used to denote these relative
powers in an empirical model. In view of this constraint, we specify a
common utility function20. The empirical model is not nearly as restrictive
as this may suggest. A dummy for female headship as well as the
education and age of both parents are included as regressors. This allows
for the possibility that mothers and fathers have different preferences over
child labour and that relatively well educated mothers have greater power
in decision making. The child hours equation also contains an indicator for
whether the child is the child of the household head, and this allows for
differential treatment of nephews, siblings, or other relations of the head.
Labour supply conditional on lifecycle-income
Since it is unlikely that decisions about child work are made
myopically, the labour supply decision is set in a multi-period framework.
Assuming intertemporal separability, the problem can be decomposed into
two stages. In the first stage, the agent allocates wealth (full income) across
periods and, in the second stage, she conditions on full income and
allocates consumption and leisure in view of their relative prices (see
Blundell and Walker (1986), for instance)21. The second stage problem yields
                                          
20 An advantage of the unitary model in the present context is that it is amenable to multi-period
modelling and to allowing the non-separability of individual leisures in the household model
(see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1998). In rural economies where household production is
substantial, separability is a strong assumption.
21 These authors show that conditioning labour supply on the current period allocation out of
lifecycle wealth is an alternative to the Frisch approach of Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) in
which the conditioning variable that captures future anticipations and past decisions is λ, the
19
within-period marginal rate of substitution (MRS) conditions for the
relative demands for consumption and leisure that are the same as in the
static model but, as we shall see, household income, Y, is measured
differently. Let subscript i denote the child in question and let j denote all
other household members. Let instantaneous household utility be
(1) U=U(C, Li, Lj, X, ε) ,  C≥0,   Li, Lj ≥0
where U is concave and defined over joint consumption (C), individual
leisure (L) and a vector of individual and household characteristics, some
of which are observable (X) and some of which are not (ε). These include
determinants of school attendance as well as determinants of non-wage
work (see Section 5). Leisure refers to non-market time and it therefore
includes time spent at school or in activities other than wage work. The full
income budget constraint is
(2) C + WiLi + ∑j WjLj = Y + WiTi + ∑j WjTj
where W are wage rates, T are time endowments (T≡L+H, where H is
hours of work), Y is non-labour income, and the price of composite
consumption, C, is the numeraire. All terms in (1) and (2) have the
                                                                                                                                       
marginal utility of wealth. It is a particularly attractive alternative when the data, as here, are
limited to a cross section. This is because Y is observable in a cross section if consumption data
are available, while λ is not (see (4) below).
20
subscript t for the current period but this is suppressed to avoid clutter. It
is introduced in (3) and (4) where more than one period is involved.
To define non-labour income, consider the intertemporal budget constraint
defining the time path of assets (A):
(3) At+1 =(1 + r)At + ΣkWtkHtk - Ct
where r is the interest rate and k=i,j. Using (2) and (3), we can see that non-
labour income is given by
(4) Yt = Ct - ΣkWtk Htk = rAt - ∆At+1,      where ∆At+1 = At+1 - At
So a lifecycle-consistent measure of Y counts in any asset accumulation or
decumulation across periods (∆At), which is an important way of
smoothing consumption. In contrast, nonlabour income in the static model
is simply rAt, which is a valid measure only if agents are myopic or if there
exist no capital markets so that it is impossible to save and dissave22. The
wage elasticity estimated from a static model will tend to confound shifts
in wage profiles with movements along them (Blundell and MaCurdy,
1998). Since estimation of the wage elasticity is central to the current
analysis, it is important to condition on lifecycle and not static income. The
                                          
22 While formal capital markets are underdeveloped in the rural areas of most low-income
countries, there is considerable evidence of informal means of saving and dissaving (see Besley,
21
equality in (4) permits measurement of Y in a cross-section as the difference
between household consumption and the labour earnings of all household
members (C-ΣkWk Hk) 23.
The first order conditions are obtained by maximising (1) subject to
(4):
(5a) Uc - εc = λm
(5b) ULi - εi ≥ λm Wi
(5c) ULj - εj ≥ λm Wj
where Uk denotes the marginal utility of k, λm is the marginal utility of
money, and taste heterogeneity is introduced through the ε terms. The
implied labour supply function for individual i (the child) in period t,
given H=T-L, is
(6) Hi = Hi (Wi, Wj, Y, X, ε)≤ T
where the inequality is strict for an interior solution. So child labour
depends on household income, the child wage, and the wage rates of other
household members. We could equally transform the first order conditions
                                                                                                                                       
1996). The Pakistan data used in this paper reveal that between 43% and 50% of households
reported borrowing or lending money in 1991.
23This measure of Y is in fact net dissaving- a consumption based measure of nonlabour income.
Note that Altonji (1983) uses food consumption as a proxy for the unobserved marginal utility
of money in his analysis of multi-period labour supply decisions of American men.
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to arrive at a conditional demand equation with child hours of work
conditioned on parent hours of work (quantities) and non-labour income.
Since parent work hours are likely to be endogenous, we prefer the form in
(6) which conditions on parent wages (relative prices).
Subsistence and the wage elasticity of hours of work
Let’s introduce a subsistence constraint by defining C*≡C-Cs, where Cs
is subsistence consumption and C* is the excess of consumption over
subsistence. Since U is not defined for consumption levels below
subsistence24, C is replaced by C* everywhere.
Using (5) but suppressing the taste terms, we can write down the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and child leisure, f, as
(7)  i
i
i WL
C
LCf =
∂
∂
−≡
*
,
* )( ,               C*>0, LI>0
Holding ΣjWjHj constant and taking total derivatives in (2) and (7)
respectively yields
(8) dC* + Wi dLi + Li dWi  = dY,        fC dC
*  + fL dLi = dWi
                                          
24 And for Wi<(Cs-Y-ΣjWj Hj)/Ti, the labour supply curve is not defined.
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We can obtain partial derivatives with respect to Y by setting dWi = 0
and partial derivatives with respect to Wi by setting dY = 0. Using (7) and
(8) now yields
(9)  
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where fC and fL  are the partial derivatives of f with respect to its arguments,
the first term on the right hand side is the pure substitution effect (>0) and
the second term is the income effect (<0 if leisure is normal). So we have the
familiar result that the slope of the labour supply curve depends upon
which of these effects is larger.
In order to derive conditions under which the relative strength of
these effects can be assessed, we need to impose structure on the utility
function. If f(C*, L) is restricted to be homothetic, so that f=g(C*/L) then (9)
becomes
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution between net consumption and
leisure, and σ=1 in the Cobb-Douglas case25. Multiplying by (Wi/Hi) in (9)
and substituting out Hi  using Hi=[Ci
*- (Y-Cs)]/Wi, got by rearranging (2a),
we get an expression for the wage elasticity,
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It follows directly from (11) that when household consumption is at
the subsistence level (C*=0), then εw= -1. This is consistent with the intuitive
notion of the child working towards a target income where the target is
defined as the shortfall between subsistence requirements and other
household income. Suppose that households are not exactly at subsistence
but are nevertheless very poor. Then C* is not zero but close to zero and the
first term in square brackets in (9) is close to zero for all values of σ. In this
case, as long as the non-labour income of individual i (the child) falls below
subsistence requirements (Y<Cs), εw<0. Thus, once subsistence constraints
are incorporated into a model of labour supply, it is clear that the income
effect of a wage change will tend to dominate the substitution effect for
very poor households26.
                                          
25 The derivation of (10) under homotheticity is detailed in the Appendix to Barzel and
MacDonald (1973). .
26 If Y≥Cs, εw>0 for σ≥1.
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It may be convenient to further assume that σ is constant. The MRS
for the CES form is
(12) f(C*, Li) = 
σ
α
α
/1
*1



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−
iL
C
At C*=0, it follows from (12) that fC is infinite
27 and we obtain from  (7) and
(9) that
(13)  
i
i
i
i
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H
W
H
−=
∂
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from which it follows again that εw= -1. At C
* close to zero, fc is very large
and we can see from (9) that the wage elasticity for positive Hi will be
negative.
We are now in a position to explicitly define the hypothesis and its
testable implications. The strong form of our poverty hypothesis is that
households are “subsistence poor” in the specific sense that income
without child earnings falls below subsistence requirements. Its weaker
form is that households are poor enough that the income effect of a change
in the child wage dominates the substitution effect, other things being
equal. We therefore estimate (6) using income defined in (4) and use
                                          
27 This is best seen by differentiating the logarithm of f with respect to C.
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estimates of the wage elasticities for boys and girls (with reference to (11)
or (13)) to test the poverty hypothesis28.
Notice that the strong form of our poverty hypothesis is equivalent to
the luxury axiom in the seminal paper by Basu and Van (1998). This paper
presents a method for empirical verification of that axiom. Basu and Van
denote household poverty by the adult wage rate in order to focus
attention on an interesting configuration of labour market equilibria. We
generalise this by characterising household poverty as dependent on adult
earnings, non-labour income and any saving or dissaving performed by the
household (see equation (6)). The generalisation is important because there
is huge inequality in asset (especially land) distribution in low-income
countries.
5. Estimation Strategy
5.1. Conditioning On Participation
We estimate hours of work conditional on participation because it is
only on the intensive margin (continuous changes in hours of work) that
the wage elasticity of labour supply can be negative29. I have confirmed that
the wage elasticity is positive in participation equations estimated on these
                                          
28 The poverty hypothesis is that if households are very poor then we will observe a negative
wage elasticity. Conversely, finding a non-negative wage elasticity implies rejection of the
poverty hypothesis. Note that we cannot and do not claim that a negative wage elasticity
implies extreme poverty. [Ref.: If A⇒B then not-B⇒not-A. However, it does not follow that B
implies A.]
29 While this greatly reduces the available data points, it is the only theoretically-consistent way
to proceed.
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data. If Ih is an indicator variable for participation in work, then observed
hours, H, are given by H=H* if Ih=1 and H=0 otherwise. To control for
selection bias, the inverse Mills ratio (λ) estimated from the work
participation equation is included as a regressor in the hours equation
(Heckman, 1974). To increase the robustness of this procedure to the
assumed parametric distribution of the unobserved error terms, λ2 is also
included in the model. This approach rests on the semiparametric series
estimator principle of Newey, Powell and Walker (1990)30.
5.2. The Empirical Model
This section translates the theoretical model in to an estimable model,
subject to constraints imposed by the data. The sensitivity of the results to
some of the choices made here is investigated in Section 7. The variables in
(6): Hi = Hi (Wi, Wj, Y, X, ε) are defined as follows. Two definitions of hours
of child wage work, Hi,  can be constructed from the survey. One refers to the
week before the survey and the other to the annual average of weekly
hours of work. Tables 1 and 2 use the first definition. The statistical
analysis to follow reports results using both definitions. The child wage rate,
Wi, is measured as earnings divided by hours of work. This introduces a
                                          
30 Using US data, Newey, Powell and Walker (1990) investigate the robustness of estimates of
women’s labour supply to the normality assumption. They find no statistical difference between
the conventional 2-step Heckman estimates and semi-parametric estimates obtained using the
series estimator. They also find that semiparametric estimates of the first stage participation
equation are not significantly different from ML estimates. They conclude, in line with Mroz
(1987), that the sensitivity of estimates of the hours of work model for women in the US
depends more upon correct specification of the regression function and the choice of
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potentially spurious negative correlation of W and H, to deal with which
the wage is instrumented (see Section 5.4)31. Measurement of earnings is
complicated by the fact that some payments are in kind and also by the fact
that earnings are reported for different payment frequencies and these
have to be brought to a common denominator. We have performed this
harmonisation and have incorporated payments in kind using cluster-level
grain prices and information on quantities of grain received. (Clusters are
the sampling units one level above households and they roughly
correspond to rural communities)32. The wage rates of other household members,
Wj, are calculated in an identical fashion. However it is not uncommon in
these data that the child is in wage work but several of her household
members –including her parents- are not. The parents may, for example, be
in farm work. As a result, wj records many missing values
33. There are two
ways of dealing with this problem. One is to predict wj using the Heckman
procedure. The other is to replace the wage rate of person j with the age
                                                                                                                                       
instrumental variables than on specification of the error distribution. In this paper, particular care is taken
to investigate the robustness of the specification for child labour supply (Section 7).
31 Note that the wage rate is specific to the individual child – it is not constrained to be the local market
wage - which is available and used as an instrument.
32 The World Bank provides a file containing the components of household income and expenditure with
the data. This includes computation of the earnings and work hours of every individual in the household.
The adjustments mentioned are made in these files but we corrected some errors and altered some
assumptions.
33 For boys in wage work, 52.5% of fathers and 75.4% of mothers do not report a wage. For girls
in wage work, 70% of fathers and 26% of mothers do not report a wage. (Notice the strong
suggestion of complementarity in mothers’ and daughters’ involvement in wage work). Is this
because of specialisation within the household or does it suggest that children are only put in to
wage employment when their parents cannot work, for example, on account of illness or
disability? The data suggest specialisation: 73% of fathers and 55.3% of mothers of wage
working children are engaged in work on the household farm or enterprise.
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and educational level of person j. Both methods were implemented but the
second is preferred because it is cleaner and because the impact of parents’
education and age on child labour is of independent interest (see Section
4.1). Since children in rural areas of low-income countries typically live in
large integrated households, j goes up to 7 for the average household, In
view of the small sample size available after conditioning on participation,
we include  only the Wj (age and education) of the child’s parents. The
labour supply of other adults and siblings is “represented” in Y (see
below). Formally, this amounts to assuming separability of the leisure of
these individuals from the leisure of the child34. To investigate whether this
makes any significant difference, parents’ education and age was replaced
by the average education and age of all adults in the household- this did
not alter the wage and income elasticities. The omission of sibling terms as
regressors is partially addressed by grouping siblings, a specification
which is discussed in Section 7.2.
The lifecycle-consistent measure of non-labour income, Y is defined for
period t in (6) as (rAt-∆At+1)=(Ct-ΣkWtkHtk). This equality, which flows
directly from the budget constraint, shows that information on asset
changes is not necessary and that Y can be measured with cross-sectional
data as long as they contain household consumption (C) and the labour
income of all household members (ΣkWkHk)- which the survey we use does.
                                          
34 Many analyses of labour supply and certainly all analyses of child labour assume separability
for all household members. We relax this assumption for parents, holding on to it for pragmatic
reasons for other individuals. Even this degree of restriction is investigated.
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Recall that the child may be engaged in any of the following
activities: wage work, work on the household farm or enterprise, school,
none of the above (see Table 1). Therefore, exogenous regressors, X, will
include variables that determine the relative attractiveness of these
activities. For example, we include a measure of land owned by the
household which, at given household size, reflects the marginal
productivity of farm/enterprise work35, and dummy variables for the
presence of different types of school in the village, which proxy the cost of
school attendance36.
To summarise, individual-level regressors other than the child wage
are a quadratic in age and a dummy indicating whether the child was ill in
the month preceding the survey. A full set of birth-order dummies and
dummies describing the relation of the child to the household head (child,
nephew, etc) were experimented with but these are not retained because
they are insignificant and degrees of freedom are limited. Household-level
variables other than a quadratic in income and parents’ education and age are
acres of land owned, household size, indicators of the age-gender composition of
the household, a dummy for whether the head is a female and religion. The
                                          
35 Rosenzweig (1980) presents formal models of labour supply in landholding and landless rural
households. His analysis underlines the importance of conditioning on farm size when
analysing wage labour, something that many existing empirical studies of child labour do not
do.
36 This is equivalent to specifying a reduced form in a time allocation model. We have also
estimated a model in which the completed school years of the child is included as a regressor
(see Section 7).
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proportion of household members in different age-groups capture the
stage of the lifecycle at which the household is. Additional regressors
measured at the village (or cluster) level are indicators for the presence of a
primary, middle and secondary school, and the unemployment rate (calculated
by aggregation of individual responses). The local unemployment rate
allows for disequilibrium in the labour market and the common practice of
excluding it from labour supply models results in mis-specification (see
Ham 1986, Card, 1988). The equation also includes province dummies that
will pick up more aggregate regional effects including demand effects.
5.3. Functional Form
A flexible functional form which permits negative curvature of the
labour supply curve at low wages and low levels of household (nonlabour)
income is
(14) Hi = α + βlnWi + γ1Yi + γ2Y2i + θ(lnWi)(Yi) + δXi + ei
where Xi incorporates all exogenous variables including Wj (that is
measures of the wage rates of child i’s parents), and the interaction term
between Yi and Wi allows the wage elasticity to vary with the level of
household income. We expect θ>037. The wage elasticity is ∂lnHi*/∂lnWi =
                                          
37 If we were interested in investigating the possibility that the adult labour supply curve bends
backwards in a population where living standards are well above survival levels, we would
include the square of the logarithm of the wage in the hours equation. This would allow the
wage elasticity of hours of work to change sign with the level of the wage rate. In our context,
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(1/Hi)[β + θYi]. Of course if θ=0, the poverty hypothesis in its weak form is
simply β<0 and, in its strong form, it is β/Hi= -1. This semilog-linear form
may be thought to provide a local linear approximation to a range of more
complex functions.
Since Y (net dissavings) can take negative values, it cannot be logged.
Amongst labour supply studies that use lifecycle models, some specify a
Stone-Geary or CES utility function and this results in the term (Y/W) in
the model, which provides a normalisation of Y (see Blundell, Duncan and
Meghir (1994), for example). A difficulty with adopting this specification in
this paper is that it restricts the wage elasticity to be more negative at higher
levels of income, contrary to what we would expect in rural Pakistan38.
5.4. Instrumental Variables
Endogeneity and Measurement Error
This section discusses the reasons why household income and the
child wage may need to be instrumented, it describes the instruments used,
and it then sets out the estimation method.
                                                                                                                                       
the parallel argument is that the wage elasticity may change sign with the level of household
income (and therefore, possibly, with the adult wage rate). There is no similar reason to include
a quadratic in the child wage rate.
38 This is consistent with the textbook case of backward bending labour supply where the
income effect dominates the substitution effect at high wage rates (or high income). The poverty
hypothesis proposed in Section 4 argues that the income effect may become very large at low
wage rates (or low household income)- see preceding footnote as well. Let us re-specify (11)
using the alternative functional form involving (Y/W) as, H= βlnW+λ(Y/W). Then the
restriction that the wage elasticity is more likely to be negative at high income levels follows
from the coefficients taking the plausible signs, β<0 and θ<0.
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In a lifecycle model, income (Y) is endogenous by virtue of being
defined by (past) consumption and leisure choices. Income is also
notoriously difficult to measure accurately and this is especially true in
rural economies. Our measure of income (see (6)) is obtained by taking the
difference of consumption expenditures and household labour income, and
differencing will tend to increase the noise-signal ratio39. This strengthens
the case for instrumenting household income. Available instruments for Y
are the going agricultural wage rate for men obtained from questions put
to village leaders, indicator variables for whether the cluster has a shop, a
market, a bus running through it, a canal, electricity, and water supply, and
the cluster-level average of Y (as in (6)). Tests of overidentifying restrictions
reject some of these and we retain a smaller set (see Table 5). Having more
than one instrument is very useful (Card (1994) highlights the problems
that may arise when a single instrument is used).
If unobservables like laziness (tastes for work) are negatively
correlated with both the wage and the hours of work of the child then the
wage coefficient will be subject to endogeneity bias. Measurement error in
the wage is also a potentially serious problem. Apart from any reporting
errors, it is computed by dividing earnings by hours worked and, left
                                          
39 Let C* denote true consumption and E* denote true total labour earnings in the household and
let these variables be measured with random errors denoted u and e with variances σu and σe.
The measured variables are then  C=C*+u and E=E*+e. The lifecycle measure of Y, net dissaving,
is defined as (C-E) which equals (C*-E*)+(u-e), where var(u-e)=σu+σe-2cov(u,e), which we
suspect is larger than σu, the variance of the measurement error when household living
standards are measured simply by consumption, C, rather than net dissaving, Y. At the same
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uncorrected, this procedure will induce a spurious negative correlation
between work hours and the wage (which is bigger, the bigger the
measurement error in hours). Finding a valid instrument for the wage in a
labour supply equation is a difficult problem. What existing estimates of
adult labour supply equations typically do is instrument the wage with
education (for example, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986), Hernandez-Licona
(1996), Fortin and Lacroix (1997)) on the arguable assumption that
education does not affect preferences for work (see the objection to this in
Pencavel, 1986). This assumption may be especially strong when the data
refer to children40. This paper therefore uses the going agricultural wage
rates for men and children at the cluster level as instruments. To increase
the predictive power of the first-stage regression, we use the completed
school years of the child as an additional instrument and, in contrast to
most labour supply analyses, present tests of the overidentifying
restriction. Since this test rejects education in the case of girls though not in
the case of boys, it is dropped from the girls’ wage equation41.
                                                                                                                                       
time, the signal in (C-E) is diminished to the extent that C and E tend to be close to each other.
As a result, the noise-signal ratio is expected to be larger for Y than for C.
40 An equation with completed schooling included as an additional regressor was estimated and
results are discussed in Section 7. This equation corresponds to a conditional demand equation.
We prefer a more “reduced form” specification that includes the price of schooling (proxied in
the empirical model by indicators for access to different levels of schooling in the village) rather
than its quantity. See Section 5.2.
41 Girls’ education is not a strong predictor of their wages so the efficiency loss is not great.
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Method and Tests
The strategy for IV is set out below so as to make the interpretation of
the tests on instruments clear. For simplicity let the main equation be
written as
(15) H= Xα  + Yβ + e
where X is exogenous, Y is endogenous so that cov(Y, e)≠0. Let the
auxiliary equation describing Y in terms of exogenous variables be
(16) Y=Zγ+u
where Z includes X from (13) and instrumental variables Zk.  If u
e denotes
the estimated value of u, then estimating
(17) H=  Xα + Yβ + β0ue + e*
generates consistent estimates of β and the significance of β0 provides a test
of the exogeneity of Y (see Hausman (1978), Smith and Blundell (1986)). If
there are, say, k instruments (Z1,, Z2, .., Zk) for the endogenous variable, Y,
then, conditional on the validity of Z1,..,Zk-1, a test of the overidentifying
restriction associated with Zk is obtained by testing the null that the
coefficient on Zk is zero when it is inserted into equation (17). Alternatively,
we may suppress Z1, if this is the instrument we are most confident of the a
priori validity of, and perform an F-test on the joint significance of Z2, .., Zk
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as additional regressors in (17). This manner of testing overidentifying
restrictions is in the spirit of the Sargan test. The strength of the instruments
in the first-stage regression is given by an F test on the Zk in (16). Though it
is still unusual for applied econometricians to investigate the strength of
their instruments, it is important because weak instruments can yield
biased estimates. Indeed, Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) show that the
inverse of the F-statistic is proportional to the bias in the second stage. The
results of tests on the instruments are presented in Table 5.
6. The Main Results
There is considerable variation in hours around the mean (see Figure
2), a good deal more than is typically observed for adult hours of work in
industrialised nations. The specified model explains about 65% of the
observed variation for boys and 10% for girls. The quadratic in the Mills
ratio included to correct for selection of working children (see Section 5.1)
is insignificant in both equations, taking a positive sign for boys and a
negative sign for girls. Many of the control variables, while significant in
the participation equation, are insignificant in the hours equation but, of
interest, access to schooling reduces boys’ hours and farm size reduces
girls’ hours42. The preferred estimates are discussed in this Section and
Section 7 investigates the robustness of these results by considering a range
                                          
42 As we shall see, this is consistent with our interpretation of the wage elasticities for boys and
girls.
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of alternative specifications (Tables 3 and 4) 43. Table 5 presents tests of the
instrumental variables.
At the sample means, the wage elasticity is estimated to be –0.33 for
boys and this is significantly negative. Alternative specifications set the
range as –0.3 to –0.6 (or as –0.3 to –1.4 if one is willing to accommodate
imperfect instruments, see Section 7), so the preferred estimate of –0.33 is a
conservative one. Girls exhibit a negative wage elasticity of –0.05 that is
insignificantly different from zero. These results are robust to a range of
specifications (see Section 7).
We cannot reject the weak form of the poverty hypothesis for boys
(and the IV estimates support the strong form, that is, an elasticity not
significantly different from –1)44. The data are therefore consistent with the
view that boys are in wage work because their labour income supports
subsistence expenditures of the household. If a boy’s wage rate drops, he
works harder to make up the loss in earnings. Conversely, if his wage rate
increases, rather than exploit the higher marginal reward for effort on the
wage labour market, he works less. The income effect of a change in his
wage dominates the substitution effect.
Since the wage elasticity of girls’ work hours is insignificantly
different from zero, we cannot strictly reject the hypothesis that it is
negative. However, since it is not significantly negative, it is not clear that
                                          
43 This paper concentrates on the wage elasticity and, related, the income effect. The effects of
other regressors are discussed in a companion paper where the determinants of participation
are also presented.
44 Further discussion of the absolute size of the negative wage elasticity is in Section 8.1.
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households sending girls into wage work do this predominantly because
the additional income is necessary to meet needs. This is because, for
example, a wage elasticity of zero is also consistent with the hypothesis
that parents are selfish. Selfishness can be implicitly defined as sending a
child to work the maximum feasible hours, irrespective of the marginal
return to an hour of work. What is clear from the gender differential in the
wage elasticity is that household poverty is a stronger factor in
determining boys’ labour market participation than in the case of girls. This
is corroborated by the raw data presented in Table 6.
The wage elasticity estimate tells us that households that set boys to
work on the wage labour market are living very close to subsistence. This
implies that their marginal utility of consumption is so large that investing
in increasing the marginal return to schooling is likely to be ineffective.
This is less likely for girls. Using the Slutsky equation, it is clear that the
pure substitution effect is much larger for girls than for boys. Thus, the
labour supply of girls will be more sensitive to alteration of the relative
returns to different activities. This reinforces the conclusion that improving
returns to school for girls will impact negatively on their engagement in
labour and that this impact will be larger than for boys for any given policy
investment.
Household income has a significant negative impact on child work,
of rather smaller magnitude than we may have expected. The elasticity for
girls is twice as large as for boys. This is consistent with the data in Table 2
which show that girls’ participation rates drop more dramatically than
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boys’ as income increases45. The income elasticity for boys of –0.17 suggests
that the fraction of increments in household income arising, say, from
increases in parental income passed on to their sons is rather small. While
the negative wage elasticity remains an important result, showing that
boys need to try and maintain their earnings, the small income elasticity
suggests that the implicit target may not be set by a shortfall in subsistence
consumption. Instead, the target could, for example, be set to cover the
boys’ own costs, or the costs of sending a sibling to school. In Section 7.3,
we discuss estimates of a model that aggregates the work hours of siblings
and this does yield a much larger income elasticity. Section 8 also contains
further discussion of the poverty hypothesis.
In a companion paper, participation equations for boys and girls are
presented and these establish the reduced-form determinants of
participation in work. It is worth reiterating that estimation of hours
equations conditional on participation in this paper is not motivated by an
inherent interest in the variation in hours in the data (which is substantial
enough to stimulate interest). Rather, it is a method of eliciting from the
data the relative sizes of the income and substitution effects of a wage
change which, as argued in Section 4, provides a useful separation of the
two main economic arguments for why children work.
                                          
45 Pooling data for boys and girls would produce unreliable estimates.
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7. Investigating Robustness of the Results
How robust are our estimates? Estimates of labour supply equations
for children are thin on the ground46. Wage and income elasticities
estimated from labour supply equations for men and women in
industrialised countries have exhibited such great variation that this has
stimulated research directed at identifying the important specification
errors (see Mroz (1987) for example). Differing assumptions regarding
selection bias (especially for women whose participation rate is relatively
low), simultaneity or measurement error biases, and functional form have
been shown to yield wildly differing estimates for the same population
(e.g. Heckman, 1994). These issues are at least as pertinent for child labour
supply in developing countries and, as we shall now see, both the child
and the developing country aspect of this work raise a host of further
specification issues. In the spirit of experimental science, a range of
estimates from alternative specifications is reported. We first estimate
alternatives designed to investigate whether the results may be spurious
(Table 3). We then investigate robustness to definitions (Table 4). Tests of
the instrumental variables are in Table 5. We refer to an equation which
includes just the child wage, household income and selection correction
factors as parsimonious. All other variables listed in Section 5.2 are then
referred to as controls.
                                          
46 A handful of papers reporting positive wage elasticities for participation were cited in Section
2. I know of no estimates of the wage elasticity of child hours of work.
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7.1. Occupational Rigidity
Is the negative wage elasticity simply a reflection of low wage jobs
being associated with (packaged with) long hours? To control for this
possibility, dummies for the type of work -seasonal agriculture, permanent
agriculture and non-agricultural- are included as regressors. The seasonal
work dummy is negative and very significant. The wage elasticity for boys
falls from –0.33 to –0.25, remaining significant at 5%, and it is unchanged
for girls.
7.2. Substitution Across Types of Work
Might a negative wage elasticity for wage work reflect an inferiority
of wage work as compared with alternative types of work? Simple
tabulations show that the average household income for the sample of
wage working children is lower than for the sample of children engaged in
work on the household farm or enterprise (“household work”). This is
therefore a fair question. Now suppose that (market) wages for wage-work
are positively correlated with marginal returns to work on the household
farm and enterprise. This is entirely plausible especially when a fraction of
wage work is on other people’s farms. In this case, an increase in the wage
will reflect an increase in the return to both types of child work. If wage
work is inferior to household farm/enterprise work then an increase in the
child wage (and the resultant income effect) may create a shift of children
from wage work to “household” work. This would show up as a negative
wage elasticity in our estimates. An alternative reason that an increase in
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the wage may cause a shift from wage to farm work is that parents may
resort to using family labour on the farm when hiring in workers becomes
more expensive.
To check whether this is what drives our estimate of a negative wage
elasticity, the equation is re-estimated with the dependent variable defined
as the sum of hours in the two types of work- that is, we now add hours on
the household farm/enterprise to hours in wage labour. We find that the
wage elasticity for boys, at –0.41, is still significantly negative and no
smaller.
7.3. Instrumental Variables Estimates
See Section 5 for a discussion of the motivation and method for
instrumenting Y and W and for an account of the tests performed. Test
results are in Table 5. We are unable to reject the null of exogeneity of
income for either boys (t=0.49) or girls (t=0.84). For girls, we cannot reject
the exogeneity of the wage either (t=0.31). However, for boys, wage
exogeneity is rejected (t=2.2) in the equation including the full set of control
variables though it is not in a parsimonious version containing just the
wage, income and the selection correction factor (t=0.66). The IV estimates
are reported in Table 3. The wage elasticity for boys is now not
significantly different from –1, which supports the strong version of the
poverty hypothesis and the idea that they work towards a target income.
However this result is interpreted with caution because tests of
overidentifying restrictions reject the wage instruments for this case (and
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this case alone). Overall, the OLS estimates are projected as preferred
because, in the absence of very powerful instruments, they are likely to be
more robust (see Section 5) and also because they provide the lower and
therefore more conservative estimate of the wage elasticity47.
7.4.  Labour Demand vs Labour Supply
The negative relation of work hours and the wage is unlikely to
reflect labour demand rather than labour supply because these are individual
level data, because demand effects will be captured by province dummies
and the village-level unemployment rate and because, as we have just seen,
the result for boys persists and is even stronger when the actual wage is
replaced by the offered wage.
7.5. Income-Dependence of Wage Elasticity
If we could establish that the observed tendency for boys to maintain their
earnings in the face of wage changes is more pronounced in lower-income
households, this would support the interpretation of a negative wage effect
in terms of subsistence constraints. Ideally, the equation would be
estimated on subsamples of the data corresponding to expenditure
quartiles48. Since the numbers of working children are too small to permit
this, an interaction term between the child wage and household income is
                                          
47 The simultaneity biases in both income and the wage are expected to be positive. So
instrumenting is expected to make both coefficients more negative. This would only strengthen
our conclusions.
48 Future research should therefore investigate the hypothesis in this paper using data for a big
country like India or Brazil rather than for a relatively small country like Pakistan!
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included as an additional regressor. It acquires the expected positive
coefficient but it is poorly determined for the gender-specific samples of 10-
14 year olds. Increasing sample size by estimating the equation for 10-17
year olds makes this term significant at 10%, and it reveals a wage elasticity
declining in absolute size with household income49.
7.6. Siblings
The preferred model is estimated for individual children. It is
interesting to investigate the average responses for all children within a
household. A simple way of doing this is to define the dependent variable
as the average hours worked per child in the household (that is, total hours
of wage work engaged in by all children in the household divided by the
number of children in that age-range) and to define the child wage as an
average weighted by hours. The wage elasticity for all-boys-in-the-household
is –0.14, and for all-girls it is insignificant. The income elasticities are now
more or less unchanged. These results broadly parallel the preferred results
though they are, of course, not directly comparable. Aggregating over boys
and girls within a households produces a wage elasticity of -0.12 which is
significant in the parsimonious model but which loses significance once
control variables are introduced. The income elasticity of –0.51 for average
child hours is substantially larger than for individual boys or girls.
                                          
49 Since addition of this term does not change the elasticity estimates significantly, this case is
not presented in Table 4.
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7.7. Adult Wage Elasticity
The theoretical basis for a negative wage elasticity rests on the
individual not having sufficient non-labour income to fall back upon if she
reduces her labour supply (Section 4). It is reasonable to think that a child
can fall back not only on household assets but also on parental income. In
contrast, a parent (especially a father, unless unwell or disabled) cannot fall
back on the child’s income to the same degree. Therefore, if we find a
negative wage elasticity for children, we should expect a negative wage
elasticity for adults. This is what we find. The wage elasticities for male (-
0.29) and female (-0.20) adults are similar to those for boys50. This reinforces
the plausibility of our estimates.
7.8. Robustness to Definitions & Functional Forms
Refer to Table 4.
Control variables: In addition to the child wage (W), household income
(Y, Y2) and the inverse mills ratio (λ), the estimated equations include a set
of individual, household and region level variables described in Section 5.2.
Since some of these are likely to be correlated with the key variables of
interest (e.g., child age with child wage, acres of land owned by household
with net dissaving (income) of household), a parsimonious equation is
estimated with just W, Y, Y2 and λ. There is no statistically significant
                                          
50 The income elasticity for men is insignificant and for women, at –0.16, it is much the same as
that for boys, and significant at 1%.
46
change. For boys and girls alike, the wage elasticity is slightly larger in
absolute size.
Age-range of children: The age range is widened now primarily to
increase the sample size but since the proportion in school falls gradually
after the age of 11 and exhibits a sharp drop from 31% at age 17 to 17% at
age 18, a cut-off in the definition of children at age 17 is data-consistent. We
find that the wage elasticities are robust to widening the age definition of
children, as they register an insignificantly small increase for both boys and
girls. Consistent with what one may expect, the income elasticity is smaller
for 10-17 year olds as compared with 10-14 year olds, for both sexes.
Survey week bias: The dependent variable in the preferred equations is
the annual average of weekly hours in wage work (which the available
data permit us to calculate). This is preferred because it averages over the
agricultural seasons and because the wage rate is computed as annual
earnings divided by annual hours of work. Estimates using the natural
alternative, hours of wage work in the week before the survey, are also
presented. The wage elasticities for boys and girls do not change
significantly.
Measure of household income: The lifecycle-consistent specification of
income (net dissaving) that is used in the main equations is defined in
equation (6). We investigate the sensitivity of the wage elasticity to changes
in the measure of income used. (a) First, we use consumption per capita
(used by Altonji, 1983, for example) which is simpler than net dissaving
and may be regarded as lifecycle-consistent. (b) A further alternative that is
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explored is to use static (reported) income divided up as the labour income
of household members other than the child, and asset income. The wage
elasticity is robust to these alternative specifications. For both boys and
girls, it is insignificantly smaller under (a) and larger under (b). These
models are not preferred because, as discussed in Section 4.3, conditioning
on static measures of income can bias the wage effect.
Functional forms: The preferred model is the semi-log, primarily
because it yields the more conservative estimates of wage elasticities for
our data. The log-log specification yields a larger wage elasticity of –0.58 for
boys, while that for girls is unchanged. We also estimate a tobit model
(involving children not in work ) in place of the preferred model for hours
model conditional on participation. The wage elasticity is now negative
and significant for boys and girls. Income is negative and significant for
boys but insignificant for girls.
8. Further Analysis
This section takes analysis of the results further and also points to
directions for further research.
8.1. The Target Hypothesis
The strong form of the poverty hypothesis is that children work
towards a target income, where the target is the shortfall between income
required for subsistence and income contributed by other household
members plus asset income plus any borrowed funds (Section 4). Testing
this hypothesis does not require data on target incomes or poverty lines
48
since a verifiable empirical implication is that the wage elasticity of hours
of work is –1. We identify a wage elasticity not significantly different from
–1 for boys when the wage is instrumented. Otherwise, the wage elasticity
ranges between –0.3 and –0.6. As discussed in Section 4, this is consistent
with poverty if not subsistence-poverty. In fact, a negative wage elasticity
less than unity may be consistent with near-subsistence for the following
reasons. (1) Subsistence may be maintained by reducing the quality of the
goods basket. (2) There may be a biological range to subsistence51. (3) Since
wage-working boys average 45 hours in the reference week, they may not
have the physical capacity to maintain earnings in the face of decreases in
the wage. (4) In the case of wage increases, one may argue that
consumption is sticky and that this is why the downward adjustment is not
made to its full extent.
Let us pursue the idea of sticky consumption for a moment. Suppose
that notions of subsistence at the household level are conditioned by past
experience. For example, a parent may be addicted to tobacco, or a sibling
may be enrolled in school and expected to continue and these expenditure
“needs” may be worked into the notion of subsistence. Then it is possible
to interpret the finding of a negative wage elasticity of labour supply in
terms of “selfish” parents (the tobacco case) or “discrimatory” parents (the
sibling case) rather than in terms of extreme poverty52. In other words, the
                                          
51 See Payne (1992) in favour of this and Dasgupta (1993) and Gopalan (1992) who counter this
propostion. Empirical evidence against the adaptation hypothesis is presented in Bhargava
(1992), Schutlink et al (1993) and Spurr et al (1994).
52 The hypothesis of selfish (or discriminatory) parents is investigated in Bhalotra (2000).
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child may have to increase work hours in response to a decline in his wage
because he is financing his father’s tobacco or his sibling’s education.
8.2. The Slutsky Equation
The estimated wage and income elasticities imply that the pure
substitution effect for girls is bigger (more positive) than for boys. Using
the same data set but focusing on child work on the household farm,
Bhalotra and Heady (2000) report a similar finding. This is consistent with
the more universal finding that girls are more responsive to changes in the
real wage because their alternative to market work is home production, in
which their time is relatively valuable53.
The Slutsky condition for theoretical consistency is violated for boys
though not for girls. At the sample means, the pure substitution effect is
estimated to be –0.16 for boys and 0.092 for girls54. The violation for boys is
not altogether surprising if different households in the sample have
different target incomes or subsistence levels since the Slutsky equation is
only expected to hold for homogeneous utility functions. Our estimates are
also consistent with rejection of income pooling among household
members. In particular, the income effect of a change in the child wage may
not be the same as the direct income effect (the coefficient on household
                                          
53 School attendance is an alternative to participation for which boys may face higher marginal
returns, but our estimates condition on participation and we have seen (Table 1) that less than
1% of children combine work and school.
54 It is not terribly unusual to find negative wage elasticities and small income effects in labour
supply equations estimated for adults whether in India or the USA (see Rosenzweig, 1980, for
example).  Many authors do not explicitly evaluate the Slutsky equation.
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income) arising from, say, a change in the father’s wage or in the prices of
farm produce. Related to income pooling but distinct, Slutsky consistency
need not hold if child labour supply is not separable from the labour
supplies of other household members. For instance, an increase in the work
hours and the labour income of the mother may, in addition to having an
income effect on child work, also have a substitution effect. Further work in
these directions is merited.
9. Policy Implications & Conclusions
This paper proposes a method for discriminating between the
relative power of incentives and constraints in deciding how much
children work. We argue that if child earnings are required by the
household to maintain subsistence expenditures then we will observe a
forward falling labour supply curve for children (negative wage elasticity
at low wages). If, however, subsistence constraints do not bind then
relative returns to alternative uses of child time are expected to determine
the extent of child work.
The method is applied to investigate the causes of wage work in rural
Pakistan where the proportion of 10-14 year olds in wage work (12% of
girls and 6% of boys) is substantial in comparison with sub-Saharan Africa
and also in comparison with neighbouring India. The hours that children in
the sample spend in wage work are close to “full time” and the data
confirm that they virtually rule out school attendance. Using a large
household survey, we find a significantly negative wage elasticity for boys
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whereas the wage elasticity for girls is insignificantly different from zero.
Interventions designed to reduce child labour are thus likely to be not only
country-specific but gender-specific.
The finding for boys is consistent with the view that their income
contribution is necessary to household consumption needs. This result calls
for a reconsideration of policies that have recently been proposed as ways
of eliminating child labour55. To the extent that trade sanctions displace
children into industries that pay lower wage rates, our estimates indicate
that they will increase average hours of child work, thereby contradicting
their stated purpose. Similarly, a ban on child work may have deleterious
effects in the short run, lowering the wellbeing of both parents and
children56. There are circumstances where this is not true, even in the short
run57. For example, if the en masse removal of children from the labour
market causes adult wages to be bid up and if the impact on household
poverty is large enough (see Basu and Van, 1998). Or, if parents take the
decision on child work and their notion of a target income includes tobacco
and alcohol (see Section 8.1).
The result for boys also suggests that improving the supply (quality
and quantity) of education will not eliminate the observed tendency for
boys to work because the demand for their education is suppressed by
                                          
55 The recent surge in public interest in child labour has provoked debates on the setting of
international labour standards (e.g. Golub (1997), Fields (1995), Basu (1999), Bhalotra (1999)).
56 Schooling in Pakistan is not compulsory and the only prohibition on child work applies to
under-15s in hazardous industrial employment.
57 In the long run, if the ban induces a decline in fertility, it is likely to be beneficial.
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poverty. While the importance of investing in education is undeniable, this
research indicates that the households in rural Pakistan which send boys
into wage work are unable to afford the opportunity cost of schooling.
Why don’t they borrow to finance their childrens’ education, we may ask.
While borrowing is consistent with transient poverty if credit markets are
sufficiently developed, it is not a viable option for the chronically poor.
Even if credit markets were perfect and the poor could borrow against the
future incomes of their children, problems associated with inter-
generational contracting would arise (see Baland and Robinson, 1998).
The story the data tell is different for girls. There is only rather weak
support for the hypothesis that they work because their households are in
extreme poverty. Thus, investments that increase the return to schooling
for girls may be expected to have a non-negligible impact on their
engagement in work. Returns to school seem to be lower for girls than for
boys in South Asia, especially at lower levels of education (e.g. Kingdon,
1998)58. Given that 12% of girls are in wage work in rural Pakistan as
compared with only 6% of boys, policy might usefully be directed at
specifically increasing returns to education for girls.
                                          
58 It is of interest that returns to school appear to be similar for boys and girls in sub-Saharan
Africa (see Appleton, 1999).
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Table 1
Child Activities
Boys Girls
Total participation rates
Wage work 6.2% 11.9%
Household Farm work 22.1% 28.1%
Household Enterprise work 2.3% 1.6%
School 72.8% 30.5%
None of the above activities 14.0% 42.4%
Domestic work n.a. 99.4%
Participation in one activity
Wage work only 3.2% 6.8%
Farm work only 8.6% 21.1%
Enterprise work only 0.64% 1.2%
School only 61.3% 27.6%
Combinations of types of work
Farm & enterprise work 0.91% 0.09%
Household farm & wage work 2.1% 4.1%
Household enterprise & wage work 0.25% 0.27%
Combination of work & school
Farm work & school 10.5% 2.7%
Enterprise work & school 0.50% 0%
Wage work & school 0.74% 0.73%
Number of children
1209 1096
Notes: Rural Pakistan, 10-14 year-olds
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Table 2
Child Activities By Quartile of  Per Capita Food Expenditure
Participation Rates and Hours
Boys Girls
Wage Work
Full sample
6.2
(31)
11.9
(45)
Quartile 1
8.2
(44.6)
18.8
(31.7)
Quartile 2 6.9
(51.8)
11.5
(33.6)
Quartile 3 4.7
(40.7)
8.0
(35.5)
Quartile 4 5.0
(36.4)
9.4
(24.7)
Work on the Household Farm
Full sample
22.1
(23.3)
28.1
(13.3)
Quartile 1
24.3
(20.6)
25.4
(11.5)
Quartile 2 23.0
(23.2)
26.8
(15.3)
Quartile 3 21.1
(25.2)
29.7
(13.9)
Quartile 4 19.8
(25.1)
30.8
(12.6)
School Attendance
Full sample 72.8 30.5
Quartile 1 65.4 26.3
Quartile 2 69.3 26.8
Quartile 3 77.0 33.5
Quartile 4 79.1 36.0
Notes: All figures are percentages except figures in parentheses which are weekly hours of
work in the reference week, conditional on participation. The mean of p.c. food expenditure
by quartile in Rupees per month is 98.7, 163.1, 223.9 and 429.7. The average foodshare in the
sample is 0.50, the average p.c. food expenditure is Rs. 228.8 and average p.c.total
expenditure is Rs. 493.8.
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Table 3
Main Results and Alternative Specifications
Specification
Wage Elasticity Income Elasticity
Boys
Girls Boys Girls
1.
Preferred specification
-0.33** -0.05 -0.17* -0.34**
2. Include occupation dummies -0.25** -0.06 -0.081
(-0.18**)2
-0.54**
3. DV: wage+“household work” -0.41** 0.04
(-.16*)1
-0.020
(-0.22*)2
-0.32**
4. DV: gender-specific aggregate -0.14 (*)2
(-0.24**)1
-0.03 -0.16*
(same)
-0.37**
5. DV: aggregate over all
siblings
-0.12
(-0.12**)2
-0.51**
(same)
6. IV for w,Y: with controls -1.4** -0.19 -0.0032 0.27
7. IV for w,Y: no controls -0.45** -0.14 -0.19** -0.50*
8. Sample of adult men &
women3
-0.29** -0.20** -0.0044 -0.16**
Notes:  Dependent variable=Annual average of weekly hours of wage work for 10-14 year
olds. The preferred specification is discussed in Section 6 and the others in Section 7 of the
text. DV is dependent variable, IV is instrumental variables estimates, w is the child wage, Y
is household income, household work is work on the household farm or enterprise. N=59
for boys and 66 for girls since we condition on participation. In row 8, N=1298 men and 308
women. * denotes significance at the 10% level and **at the 5% level. 1This is the estimates
when the dependent variable is hours in the reference week. 2This is the estimate obtained
when all control variables are dropped. 3In row 8, the boys column presents estimates for
men (18-59) and the girls column for women (18-59 years).
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Table 4
Investigating Robustness to Definitions and Functional Forms
Specification
Wage Elasticity Income Elasticity
Boys
Girls
Boys Girls
1
Preferred specification
-0.33** -0.05 -0.17* -0.34**
2 Drop controls -0.36 -0.07 -0.23** -0.39**
3 Sample of 10-17 year olds -0.36** -0.075 (*)1 -0.12** -0.29**
4 DV = hours in last week -0.37** -0.09* -0.07* -0.19*
5. Y = consumption -0.25** -0.08 -0.15 0.28
6. Y= asset & parent income -0.38** -0.11 (**)1 -0.004, 0.24 -0.05, 0.40
7. Logarithm of hours -0.58** -0.05 -0.15
(-0.16*)2
-0.48**
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. 1Dependent variable=hours in the reference week, 2Control
variables are dropped.
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Table 5
Instrumental Variables: Some Tests
Child Wage Household Income
Boys
Girls Boys
Girls
Instruments S , S2,  Wcc,  (W
c
c)
2 . Wcm
 , (Wcm)
2 ,
Wcc, , (W
c
c)
2
Yc, shopc Yc, shopc
Power of instruments F=1.6 (19%) F=1.8 (14%) F=2.26 (11%) F=2.26 (11%)
Preferred: With controls
Test of exogeneity t=2.2 t=0.31 t =0.49 t=0.84
Test of overidentification FS,S2 =2.5, (9%)
FWc,Wc2 =2.6 (9%)
FWc,Wc2 =0.77 (47%)
FWm,Wm2 =1.2 (31%)
Fshop=0.23 (64%)
FYc=0.87 (36%)
Fshop=2.5 (12%)
FYc=0.14 (71%)
Drop controls
Test of exogeneity t=0.66
Test of overidentification FS,S2 =1.1 (34%)
FWc,Wc2=1.5 (24%)
Notes: Refer to Section 5.4 for a discussion of the instruments and the tests. Also see Section 7.3. S=completed school years of
child, Wc=child wage, Wm=adult male wage, Y=average household income, shop=dummy for whether a shop is present, and
all variables superscripted c are defined at the cluster-level.
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Table 6
Gender Comparison of Living Standards of Households With Wage-Working
Children
Boys Girls
Lifecycle-consistent income 162 279
Per capita expenditure 363 366
Wealth excluding value of land 31529 33541
Percent of households that own land 17% 26%
Household size 9.1 8.3
Notes: Sample of households with at least one 10-14 year old engaged in wage work.
Figures in rows 1-3 are in Rupees.Note that the measures of income in rows 1 and 2
include the child’s contribution to income. Section 3.2.5 shows that the percentage
contribution of boys is about 30% and that of girls about 15% and this reinforces the
result that households with wage-employed boys are poorer on average than households with
wage-working girls.
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Figure 1
Child Participation Rates by Quartiles of Household Food Expenditure Per Capita
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Figure 2
Hours of Wage Work
Boys
-5 15 35 55 75 95
.001656
.018208
Girls
-5 15 35 55 75
.004099
.023698
Notes: ‘Children’ are 10-14 year old. The figures show a kernel density fitted to data on
hours worked for wages in the reference week.
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Figure 3
The Relation of Hours of Work and Expenditure:
Nonparametric Estimates
Boys
Girls
Notes: Child hours in wage work conditional on participation as a function of
the logarithm of per capita expenditure of the household. The nonparametric
estimation uses a Gaussian Kernel. Hours refer to hours worked in the
reference week by 10-14 years old.
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Figure 4
Hour-Wage Scatter
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